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

The Evolution of AMERICAN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

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specialists to handle US Air Force-flown imagery. Certain other MI units were also found in Europe in the 1960's, but all of them were a part of this intricately tailored support picture.

In the Pacific, a similar approach emerged. The 500th MI Group, with headquarters in Japan (in Hawaii after 1965) provided theater level collection support. In Korea, 8th Army was given the 502d MI Battalion for support. Similar MI support arrangements were found wherever US Army units were garrisoned overseas.

Cryptologic support paralleled that just described. In Europe, the 7th Army was supported by the 507th ASA Group, which in turn had the 318th and 319th ASA Battalions each supporting a corps. In Korea, the 508th ASA Group supported 8th Army.[58]

In CONUS, the concep was modified somewhat. Each Army division was provided with an organic MI detachment, which had the specialties (IPW, II, OB, and CI) that characterized the MIO. At Fort Hood and Fort Bragg, there were MI Battalions (the 319th and 519th) of the field army type. Similarly, ASA units were stationed in CONUS and dedicated to support Army field forces. All of these CONUS based units were insufficient in both numbers and capabilities to meet the need for the sudden expansion of the Army brought on by Vietnam, but they provided an excellent base for mobilization and made it possible to meet the requirements of the war in Southeast Asia rapidly.

Aerial Surveillance and the Cuban Crisis

Although not a strictly Army contribution, imagery intelligence was a key ingredient in the international crisis of 1962, when offensive missiles were introduced into Cuba. U2 photography of 14 October convinced President Kennedy that a crash program of low-level aerial surveillance was needed. When the USAF found that the quality of the photography was not what it required, the then retired General Goddard was called in by air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay. Goddard quickly explained that the Air Force was using the wrong equipment, detailed where the cameras needed were stored, and how to install the cameras in a RF-101.

It is widely considered that President Kennedy's effective handling of the crisis was made possible by the quality of the intelligence he was receiving. Certainly a large part of that intelligence is a direct result of the efforts of Goddard in creating an aerial intelligence gathering capability.[59]

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[58]It should be also noted that the organization and interrelationships between the 66th MI and 513th MI groups were not as clearcut as described here. Ultimately the 513th was absorbed by the 66th. Nonetheless, the basic concepts were in line with the MIO. Similarly the roles of the 507th and 508th ASA groups and their battalions were not "pure" in accord with the concept.

[59]George W. Goddard, with DeWitt S. Copp, Overview: A Lifelong Adventure in Aerial Photography, Doubleday, Garden City, N.Y., 1969, p. xi-xii.